The rise of commerce over
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of commerce over the Internet and telephone has led to an increase in the use of a new type of standard form contracts, commonly called "pay now, terms later" or "rolling"
contracts. In such contracts, the buyer orders a good over the phone or the Internet but does not have an opportunity to review the standard terms governing warranties, limitations on liability, and other elements of the purchase until later, when the contract arrives bundled together with the good. A typical example is a license that has been shrink-wrapped inside a software package.
It cannot be read until after purchase, when the box is opened. Airplane tickets and most goods purchased by phone are other everyday examples.
Opinions about rolling contracts are sharply divided. Some scholars and judges believe that rolling contracts facilitate transactions and simply reflect the technological evolution of mass Easterbrook endorsed the use of rolling contracts as long as buyers had a right to review and reject the standard terms. He pointed out that in many circumstances it would be impractical or nearly impossible for sellers to communicate their standard terms to buyers prior to purchase.
Clayton Gillette has also pointed out that, as a practical matter, delayed disclosure is unlikely to make any difference to buyers since they rarely read form contracts. 3 Randy Barnett and Robert
Hillman offer complementary arguments to justify treating rolling contracts like any other form contract. 4 Douglas Baird recommends that in the absence of evidence of systematic advantagetaking, contractual innovations associated with new technologies should be allowed to evolve naturally.
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Other commentators vehemently disagree with the notion of rolling contracts, arguing that delayed disclosure runs afoul of the contract-based-theory of mutual assent. 6 Stewart 1 86 F.3d 1447 (7 th Cir.1996). 2 105 F.3d 1147 (7 th Cir. 1997). 3 Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, Wis. L. Rev. 679 (2004) . 4 Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 Fordham L. Rev, 627 (2002) (noting that the hostility towards form contracts in general stems from the implicit adoption of promise-based conception of contracts; when this is abandoned, rolling contracts appear to be less problematic); Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 743 (2002) (arguing that Llewellyn's theory of blanket assent to reasonable terms should govern the enforcement of rolling contracts).
5 See James J. White, Default Rules in Sales and the Myth of Contracting Out, 48 Loyola L. Rev. 53 (2002) at 70, citing letters from Douglas G. Baird [hereinafter Baird, Letter] and from Alan Schwartz [hereinafter Schwartz, Letter] to Lawrence J. Bugge, Chair, UCC Article 2 Drafting Committee (March 9, 1999 Macaulay stated that "it hurts to be told that these are contracts" and that "if you are a contract purist, it is very difficult to offer a convincing argument that these clauses work to create a contract with the desired effect." 7 Together with consumer advocates, this group of scholars argues that rolling contracts should not be enforceable because of their potential for abuse. In particular, by concealing the terms until after the buyer has received the good, sellers may be inclined to offer less favorable terms. For example, Jean Braucher argues that marketing products to consumers without effectively communicating standard terms before payment is unfair and deceptive, as well as a violation of various federal and state acts. 8 Moreover, if standard terms cannot be reviewed until after the product is delivered, comparison shopping becomes costlier and thus the forces of competition, which might otherwise induce sellers to internalize buyers' interests in the setting of standard terms, will be diminished. 9 Finally, commentators have paid special attention to transactions involving that involve the general public as opposed to large business buyers, since the former may be less able to comparison shop effectively.
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Neither side of the debate, however, can point to any systematic evidence to support its position. This paper fills the gap by studying the standard terms offered by software companies who sell their products online. Several factors make this a particularly appropriate environment in which to address the question of bias in "hidden" contract terms. First, the End User License Agreement (EULA) associated with each software product presents a rich standard form contract. Second, there is dramatic variation in how forthcoming companies are in presenting their EULAs on their website to potential buyers. Some software publishers show the terms to buyers before purchase, while others simply do not (i.e., they use rolling contracts). Third, software products are homogeneous enough from company to company to allow for meaningful large-sample comparisons of their EULAs. Thus, a simple way to test which side is right-those who favor rolling contracts or those who oppose them-is to compare the standard terms offered by software companies that do and do not utilize rolling contracts.
I conduct my analysis using a unique, hand-collected sample of 515 software EULAs.
This is a large subsample of the EULAs that I analyze in a recent paper. 11 The current sample includes EULAs for one or at most two representative products for each of 468 software publishers who sell their products through their corporate website. The companies whose EULAs are included in the sample include virtually all well-known software publishers as well as hundreds of smaller firms. In addition, each product's EULA is classified as either "business," if the product is directed to business users, and "consumer," if the product is directed to the general public or home office users, which allows for separate analyses of each sample.
To determine whether firms that delay disclosure offer more one-sided terms than those that are forthcoming, I measure the "net buyer friendliness" of each EULA using a simple index.
This index is based on an analysis of 25 common standard contract terms that allocate rights and risks between buyers and sellers. 12 It includes terms pertaining to acceptance of the license notices, scope of the license, restrictions on transfer, warranties and disclaimers of warranties, limitations on liability, maintenance and support services, and conflict resolution. I assign a negative one point score for each term that is more pro-seller relative to the default rules of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and a positive one point score for each term that is more pro-buyer relative to the default rules. I give a score of zero if the contract is silent in regards to the specified term, or if the specified term matches the default rule. The overall proseller or pro-buyer bias of a given EULA is computed as the sum of the values for each of the 25 terms. While crude, this methodology captures the overall bias of the EULA in a way that allows for an empirical analysis. I also relax the implicit assumption that each of the 25 terms matters equally to buyers by using seven subindexes that isolate the bias in particular sets of terms.
11 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, NYU Law and Economics Working Paper No. 05-11 (2005) .
12 Id.
My main findings concern the relationship between contract bias and pre-purchase accessibility. I find that companies that provide their EULAs to consumers only after purchase, i.e., that utilize a rolling contract, do not offer more pro-seller terms than firms that make their EULAs available pre-purchase. These results should be reassuring to those comfortable with the logic of the ProCD ruling and the increasing presence of rolling contracts. In fact, contrary to the concerns expressed by supporters of pre-sale disclosure, I find that those companies that force consumers to click "I agree" to the terms of a EULA before completing their purchase actually present somewhat more pro-seller terms than firms that offer rolling contracts. Sellers, it seems, are not being sneaky by "hiding" one-sided contracts. Instead, sellers whose boilerplate is more one-sided tend to make their contract harder to challenge by requiring buyers to unequivocally accept it. These results hold for both consumer-and business-oriented products.
In summary, this paper tests and rejects the notion that "pay now, terms later" contracts are worse for buyers. At least with respect to software license terms, buyers do not, on average receive more pro-seller contracts when the terms are disclosed only after purchase.
Commentators and consumer advocates, then, should not be particularly concerned about rolling contracts. It is important to note, however, that the tests in this paper are not designed to answer the broader question of whether all EULAs, or standard form contracts in general, contain poor quality terms according to some absolute standard. Rather, the results suggest that, to the extent there are inefficiencies associated with standard form contracts, they are not made worse by delayed disclosure. The results call into question the desirability of recent proposals urging for mandatory pre-sale disclosure and proposals urging notice that terms will follow in situations where disclosure is inconvenient or impossible.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the debate over the desirability of rolling contracts. Section III describes the general methodology and the sample of EULAs.
Section IV describes the pre-purchase accessibility of software EULAs. Section V discusses the pro-seller and pro-buyer bias of EULA terms. Section VI contains the main analysis, examining the bias in terms as a function of pre-purchase accessibility. Section VII concludes.
13 See Robert A. Hillman, On-line Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-standard Terms Backfire? (forthcoming, Mich. L. Rev., 2006) (questioning the desirability of mandatory disclosure of terms in Internet transactions noting that, despite its advantage of low-cost compliance, mandatory disclosure may not increase readership, and hence will not induce sellers to compete for customers by including reasonable terms, but might make suspect terms more easily enforceable).
II. ROLLING CONTRACTS: THE DEBATE
A wide range of modern transactions are governed by standard form contracts.
14 Whether the transaction involves the purchase of a car or a gym membership, the buyer is generally presented with boilerplate in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion with no opportunity to negotiate over the terms contained therein. While the buyer might be able to determine the quantity and delivery method, and might be able to bargain over price, secondary terms such as length of warranties, forum selection, and remedies for breach of contract, will be part of non-negotiable boilerplate.
Legal academics agree that the use of standardized contracts facilitates mass commerce by drastically reducing drafting and negotiating costs. 15 Moreover, some of these savings can be passed on in the form of lower prices. The use of boilerplate may also help reduce product differentiation, thus helping buyers compare prices. 16 And while some commentators are concerned about the potential for seller overreaching in the form of abusive terms, others have countered that, in addition to the legal protections granted by the UCC and doctrines of unconscionability and reasonable expectations, competitive market forces ensure that buyers' interests are taken into account.
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In traditional standard form contract exchanges the buyer is at least able to see the terms of the contract before deciding whether to purchase the good. Commerce over the phone and Internet, however, has led to the use of "rolling" or "pay now, terms later" standard forms. In exchanges involving such contracts the buyer is not able to read the contract until after she has paid for the good and received delivery. Rolling contracts have sparked heated debate. While some believe that they are essential to the development of e-commerce and new exchange mechanisms, others are concerned about their potential for abuse.
A. ProCD v. Zeidenberg and the Defense of Rolling Contracts
The scholarly debate largely originated with the 7 th Circuit's decision in ProCD v. §211 (1979) and U.C.C. §2-302, and letters cited supra note 5. 18 Supra note 1.
Zeidenberg
The plaintiff, ProCD, created a database using information from various telephone directories which it sold at two different prices. The cheapest version of the database was sold to the general public and the more expensive version was offered to manufacturers and retailers who used it to identify potential customers. To discriminate between these buyer types, ProCD included a clause limiting the use of the database to non-commercial purposes in the license agreement of the software sold at the lower price. The license was included in the software's CD-ROM and in the user's manual, and also appeared on the computer screen every time the software was run. But both the CD-ROM and the manual were inside the product's box, which could be opened only after purchase, and therefore the license constituted a rolling contract. The license also stated that the buyer could return the software within 30 days if she did not find the license agreeable.
Defendant Zeidenberg purchased the low-price version of the software in a retail store and decided to ignore the restrictions in the license by selling ProCD's database to other commercial users at a markup, but less than ProCD's commercial price. ProCD sued for an injunction against Zeidenberg. The district court held in favor of the defendant, reasoning that because at the time of purchase Zeidenberg could not have agreed to terms hidden in a box, those terms were not part of the contract.
In reversing the district court's decision, Judge Easterbrook first determined that software licenses were ordinary contracts and thus governed by the law of contracts and the UCC. 19 He then noted that it would be impractical to both sellers and buyers if the law required sellers to post the license terms in microscopic print somewhere on the box. He cited UCC section 2- 108, 119, 546 N.E.2d 888 (1989) . But see I. LAN Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (2002) at 333 (stating that "software licenses exist in a legislative void" and that in the context of a dispute between business parties "Article 2 technically does not, and certainly will not in the future, govern software licenses, but for the time being, the Court will assume that it does"). See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239 (1995) ; Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 459, 545 (2000) . the buyer could accept by using the software after having had an opportunity to read the terms of the license, as Zeidenberg had done.
While his decision hinged on general notions of contract formation, Judge Easterbrook remarked on the potential efficiency losses of not enforcing software shrink-wrap licenses. In the software industry, the majority of sales take place over the phone or the Internet where there is no box to peruse. With downloadable software, the buyer often purchases a serial number that is then used to activate the software. Failure to enforce the post-payment terms would subject manufacturers to broad implied warranty terms and consequential damages. Judge Easterbrook reasoned that such an arrangement would harm consumers by "driving prices through the ceiling or return transactions to the horse and buggy age. is made available before or after purchase. 24 Failure to read should not be a source of concern, however, since these scholars argue that sellers in well-functioning markets will compete for the business of the marginal consumer. As long as a minority of informed buyers demands contracts reflecting the general buyer population preferences and sellers are unable discriminate between buyer types, sellers will offer the preferred terms in order to obtain the business of the informed types. 25 Rolling contracts need not interfere with this process, these scholars argue, since even if sellers do not make the contract available before purchase, concerned buyers are still able to shop for terms. For instance, prior to purchase, concerned buyers can contact the seller and request the standard terms; or, after purchase, they can return the product if they find the terms disagreeable.
Clayton Gillette has argued that the interests of non-reading buyers' might be internalized by representatives such as the market, courts, and regulators. Assent by representation, he argues, can satisfy the same objectives as personal assent.
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Those who object to recent proposals to regulate rolling contract terms offer complementary arguments. Douglas Baird argues that several laws and regulations, such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, offer enough protection against unfair terms. 27 Alternatively, sellers' reputations and the forces of competitive markets will also ensure that buyers' interests are taken into account, even if buyers are presented with take-it-or-leave-it terms that cannot be bargained over. In consequence, any effort to prescribe the terms in standard form contracts will make buyers worse off because sellers will be unable to compete on the basis of the terms they 24 See Gillette, supra note 3; Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts, 21 Rand J. of Econ. 518, 533 (1990) (arguing that non-drafting parties will generally find it too costly to read pro-seller standard terms, will assume that they have been included, and discount the price they are willing to pay accordingly); Melvin Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305 (1985) (reasoning that it is rational for consumers to refuse to read the text in standard form contracts); Robert A. Rev. 155, 165 (1997) (noting that in insufficiently competitive markets sellers may include restrictive terms in boilerplate, even if doing so might mean losing some reading buyers, since more may be gained by offering restrictive terms to non-readers than by losing the business of the readers).
26 See supra note 3 at 683. 27 See Baird, Letter supra note 5.
offer. Overall, Baird suggests that additional regulation in this area should be undertaken only with caution, as it may hinder useful innovation.
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In a related vein, Alan Schwartz reasons that in situations where sellers would find it infeasible to include terms pre-purchase, a rule requiring sellers to notify buyers before purchase that additional terms are to follow is problematic. 29 Buyers will not receive any new information if sellers are required to disclose that additional terms will follow, Schwartz argues, because they already know that there will be additional terms. Requiring sellers to note that additional terms will follow just provides an opportunity for buyers to sue over whether the notice is adequate.
Litigation over this issue may override buyers' real concern, which is that the product did not perform as expected, but the buyer's claims are either precluded or too idiosyncratic to sway a jury. Schwartz concludes that a rule requiring pre-purchase notice of additional terms may just create an opportunity for wasteful litigation.
Finally, a rule requiring pre-sale disclosure by Internet retailers might seem less problematic, as sellers can easily post their standard terms on their website. Such a rule might seem likely to facilitate shopping, increase competition, and encourage sellers to offer reasonable terms. Robert Hillman, however, argues that such a rule may backfire. If buyers do not read standard terms at all, mandatory disclosure will not increase readership and term shopping. It might, however, allow suspect terms to be more easily enforced because the contracting process appears more legitimate.
30

B. Concerns About Rolling Contracts
The decisions in ProCD and Hill have left others deeply worried, and courts in a handful of jurisdictions still refuse to enforce terms that have not been explicitly agreed to. 193, 194 (1977) (noting that consumers make more accurate decisions when information is displayed in a convenient way).
III. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE
A. A Test Based on EULAs of Software Sold over the Internet
The previous section illustrates that commentators have sharply different views about whether rolling contracts are good, bad, or irrelevant. Ultimately, however, whether rolling contracts are more one-sided than regular standard terms is a fairly straightforward empirical question. This paper attempts to answer this question by exploiting the unique nature of software products sold online. In particular, using a large sample of End-User License Agreements (EULAs) of software products that are sold over the Internet, I examine whether terms offered after purchase are, or are not, more pro-seller than those available pre-purchase.
For several reasons, this is a particularly nice setting in which to test whether rolling contracts are unusually exploitative. First, as we will see, software companies vary greatly in the way they present their EULAs to potential buyers. Some present their terms prominently on their website prior to purchase. Others use rolling contracts, disclosing terms only after purchase of the software. Still others make their terms available prior to purchase, but effectively hide the contract deep in the innards of a complex website.
Second, although rolling contracts date back many years, several recent and important cases, as mentioned above, stem from transactions involving new technologies such as computer software and hardware. 37 They are particularly pervasive in e-commerce transactions, which were estimated at $69.2 billion for 2004 and are growing in importance each year. 38 An analysis of contracts for software sold online thus places us at the core of the debate.
Third, the product itself, non-customized or "pre-packaged" software, is homogeneous enough to make for a meaningful comparison of the EULAs from different companies. 
B. Sample Collection
The sample analyzed in this paper is a large subsample of that recently analyzed in Marotta-Wurgler. 39 In that paper, I present a comprehensive analysis of EULA terms and examine the role of market competition in shaping these terms. The starting point for obtaining the sample of EULAs used here was the Software Industry Directory 2005 CD-ROM, a comprehensive list of 7,700 software development and publishing companies. The companies in the Directory are mostly U.S.-based and range from $50,000 in sales to giants such as Microsoft and IBM. All market software of one type or another to U.S. buyers. For each company in the Directory, I manually determined whether the company sold its software online through its corporate website, i.e. where a buyer could select a product and click all the way through to payment and checkout.
Limiting the sample to companies that sell their products directly through their website, although they may utilize other distribution channels, enables me to clearly document how firms differ in the way they present EULAs to buyers before purchase. However, since virtually all prepackaged software companies sell their products, at least in part, through their website, this sample selection procedure should be interpreted mainly as a way of weeding out thousands of custom software publishers (e.g., systems integrators) and resellers who do not actually manufacture the software sold through their website. Custom developers do not offer nonnegotiable standard terms. And resellers do not offer any additional data, since the EULA attaches to the product and not the particular vendor. Finally, many other companies listed in the Directory are actually divisions of bigger companies, further reducing the number of independent firms (and EULAs) to consider.
For each company in the remaining sample, I chose one representative product that could be purchased online. I selected the company's flagship software package, when it was apparent; otherwise, I chose a product at random. To test whether companies impose poorer standard terms on unsophisticated buyers, I also recorded whether the product appeared to be targeted to a 39 Marotta-Wurgler supra note 11.
consumer or business user. 40 A few dozen companies offer a "business" and "consumer" version of the same product. For these companies, I collected EULAs for both versions of the product.
The next step was to obtain the EULA for each of the selected products. Some companies make their licenses easily available on their website, while others require some (and perhaps considerable) trial-and-error searching. If the EULA was available anywhere on the site, I
collected it. Otherwise, I emailed the company asking if the EULA was available on their website (to double-check that it was not) and if not, to please email or fax it to me. Most companies complied, although a small fraction did not answer repeated requests, and thus could not be included in the sample. To reduce selection bias further, I purchased a handful of products to obtain the EULA.
This process led to a sample of 515 EULAs. Since, as mentioned above, I collected two EULAs for 47 companies, the sample covers 468 distinct companies. The sample includes
EULAs from almost all well-known software publishers and hundreds of smaller ones.
I also collected several other product and company characteristics for use as control variables. I recorded the selected product's price, recognizing that all else being equal, good terms for consumers are more costly to provide. Finally, many companies offer a free version of their products for buyers to try for a limited time period. In some cases, these trial versions contain the EULA of the retail version of the product, although generally they do not. Still, I
noted whether a trial version of each product is available, since this enables buyers to verify whether the product suits their needs, is compatible with their system, and so forth. Other company-level characteristics in the Directory dataset (or, where missing, gathered from other sources, such as Hoover's Online, or direct correspondence with the company) include annual revenues, whether a company is publicly traded or private, the year of incorporation, and number of employees. Many sellers ship the software and the EULA to a physical address provided by the buyer. Sometimes, however, buyers can download the software directly from the seller's site. In these cases, if the buyer is unable to access the EULA until after she has paid for the software, the EULA will still be coded as "not findable," since it is not accessible until after purchase, which is the critical distinction. 43 Arguably, products sold without a EULA are among the most buyer friendly, as they are sold outright and not licensed and include the implied warranties of the UCC. I thank Lewis Kornhauser for this point. I exclude these cases from my analysis of the effects of contract location on contract bias because the location of a contract that does not exist is hard to define. In any case, there are only four companies that use no EULA whatsoever and that would otherwise be in my sample. Not surprisingly, all are quite small.
Given that the EULA is findable somewhere on the website, I also measured whether it was relatively more or less accessible. To do so, I started by determining the most obvious or most natural navigational path through the website that a consumer would use to purchase the product. This is usually quite straightforward, since commercial websites are designed to get buyers to purchase as easily as possible, starting from the homepage. I then counted the "distance," in terms of the minimum number of clicks, between the most obvious click path to purchase and the actual location of the EULA. EULAs that were a greater number of clicks away from the most natural path of purchase were deemed less accessible, albeit still findable. A buyer belonging to (or at least aspiring to) the "informed minority" would find it easier to comparison shop among firms with low distance scores.
For example, consider a buyer who wishes to purchase Internet Security 7.0 from McAffee's website. After selecting the product and proceeding to check out, he will discover that before he is allowed to enter his credit card information, he must agree to the product's EULA by clicking on "I agree" below a scroll box that contains the standard terms. Because the EULA is directly on the most natural click path for purchasers and requires no extra clicks to find, it has a distance score of zero. As Table 2 shows, 4.7% of sellers, or about 10% of those that make the EULA available on the website site, score a zero, indicating the maximum possible degree of pre-purchase accessibility.
Symantec, on the other hand, presents a license for its Norton Antivirus 2005 product that is a minimum of two clicks away from the most obvious path of purchase. A link at the bottom of the Symantec homepage, entitled "license agreements," provides links to the EULAs of Symantec products. Thus it takes a buyer one click from the main page (which is always used as the starting point of the most natural path of purchase) to access the list of EULAs, and a second click to see the EULA of the desired product, for a total distance of two clicks.
As mentioned above, McAfee forces the buyer to acknowledge that he agrees to a license before he is allowed to pay. The buyer may or may not read the terms in the screen, but by clicking "I agree" he knows that the software is governed by a license and that he has agreed to its terms. The same is true for companies that force buyers to check "I agree" in a box before entering their credit card information, although they may not show the actual EULA without one more click on the provided link. In these peculiar in-between cases, I record the distance as 0.5, because, although the buyer must actively acknowledge the existence of a contract, he must also click once to see its terms. Table 2 shows that 1% of all sellers, or 2% of sellers whose EULAs were Findable, display their license to buyers in this manner. To more clearly capture the distinction between EULAs where the buyer is forced to acknowledge a EULA from those where it is not explicitly presented prior to purchase (and can only be found through a determined search), I label EULAs with distance scores of 0 and 0.5 as "Forced." About 5.7% of sample firms, or 11.8% of those that make their EULAs findable, fall into this group. Some products' EULAs are a minimum of six clicks away from the most natural path of purchase. Given the labyrinthine structure of some corporate websites, in which each page links to many others, such licenses can be extremely difficult to find.
B. Determinants of Pre-Purchase Accessibility
To see whether certain products' EULAs are more likely to be made available before purchase, Table 3 shows regressions where the dependent variable is a measure of EULA location and the independent variables include product and firm characteristics. The first two models study whether or not the EULA is findable anywhere on the website. Firm size, as measured by revenue, is the only firm characteristic that is significantly positively related to whether a EULA is findable. Specifically, the coefficient on the natural log of revenue implies that a one unit increase in this variable increases the probability that the EULA is findable by 5%. A plausible interpretation is that larger firms are more likely to have in-house counsel who may advise making the EULA available before purchase to increase its enforceability.
Developer licenses are also more likely to be findable, perhaps because license terms are more important for users of such products. Many of the benefits that these users obtain from the product hinge on how restrictive is the license. Younger software publishers are also more likely to make their EULAs available on the website. One possibility is that buyers feel less compelled to thoroughly examine the terms of a familiar seller whose reputation is well-known. A simpler explanation is that older firms are less likely to be exclusively software companies. They may sell many products online that are completely unrelated to software, thus reducing the likelihood that the structure of their website will specifically cater to the software buyer. The inclusion of product category dummies (indicating different Amazon.com "markets") does not change these results, indicating that they hold within categories as well. 44 The second pair of models further confirms this notion. Larger firms are also more likely to force buyers to agree to the terms of the EULA before allowing them to purchase. This again may reflect the advice of sophisticated in-house counsel. On the other hand, controlling for size, public firms are slightly less likely to force consumers to acknowledge a EULA. These results are less robust to the inclusion of market fixed effects.
In the last pair of models, the dependent variable is the distance score, given that the EULA is findable. These estimates indicate that (given the EULA is findable) it requires more clicks to find EULAs when the seller is larger or younger. The explanation most likely involves the fact that larger companies and, controlling for size, younger companies tend to have more detailed websites-the former because the company simply has more products to describe and to sell the latter because their webpages tend to be more sophisticated.
Interestingly, none of the regressions in Table 3 indicates any relationship between the EULA location and whether the product is consumer or business-oriented. If it were the case that sellers took advantage of naïve consumers by hiding their exploitative terms until after purchase, we might expect to see a significant negative relationship between consumer-oriented products and findability. In fact, rolling contracts are used with about equal frequency for both businessand consumer-oriented software products.
V. EULA Bias
A. Measuring Overall Bias
A software program's EULA delineates the rights and obligations of the buyer and the seller. EULAs of pre-packaged software tend to address similar issues, such as restrictions on use and transfer, warranty disclaimers, and limitations on liability, regardless of whether they apply to an anti-virus or a graphics program. As discussed in more detail in Marotta-Wurgler, software companies generally license rather than sell their software, and other than the additional posttransfer restrictions sellers can impose through licensing rather than selling, the legal implications regarding enforcement of the EULA and its terms are the same as those regarding 45 The specifications in Table 3 are all linear probability models. I also tried using logit specifications for the first four models and obtained identical results. In the case of the last two specifications, I redefined the variable "Distance" as ln((Distance + 0.01)/(6.01-Distance)) to obtain a more bell-shaped dependent variable. This again led to similar results as presented in Table 3 , with the exception that ln revenue is positively significant and ln age is negatively significant in the fifth specification. regular standard forms. 46 Many courts have held that the sale or license of software should be interpreted as the sale of a good within the meaning of the UCC. 47 Consequently, when faced with a dispute over the validity of a software EULA or a particular term contained therein, courts have relied on Article 2 of the UCC to determine its enforceability.
To measure the bias of a given EULA, I use the "EULA bias index" methodology from Marotta-Wurgler. This is a simple index that takes account of 25 common standard contract terms that allocate rights and risks between buyers and sellers. It is defined as follows. For each of 25 terms, a negative one point score is assigned if the term is more pro-seller than the default rules of Article 2 of the UCC, a positive one point score is assigned if the term is more pro-buyer relative to those rules, and a zero score is assigned if the contract is silent in regards to the specified term, or if the specified term matches the default. The scores for each term are then summed up to construct an overall measure of "net buyer friendliness" for that particular EULA.
For example, a provision found occasionally in EULAs entitles buyers to receive software updates and upgrades for a specified period after purchase. Since there is no default rule in Article 2 mandating such an entitlement and since, other things being equal, a buyer would clearly prefer a EULA that entitles her to receive updates than one without such an entitlement, the presence of this provision is awarded a positive one point score in the overall index. The advantage of this overall index is that it is transparent and allows for empirical comparisons of EULAs. However, because each of the 25 terms is given the same weight, a built-in assumption is that each terms matters equally to buyers. I relax this assumption by measuring the relationship between contract location and the bias of particular sets of terms, considered separately, rather than the overall bias.
B. EULA Bias Summary Statistics
As constructed, the maximum possible overall bias score in the overall bias index is 7, corresponding to a very buyer-friendly EULA relative to the UCC default rules. The minimum 49 The index does not consider whether the warranties comply with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for various reasons. 15 U.S.C. § §2301-2312 (1976) . First, the act regulates the disclosure of consumer warranties and not whether warranties should be given or not. Second and most importantly, it is still not settled whether Magnuson-Moss applies software products. The act applies to "any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes." To this date and after heated discussion, there is still no consensus on whether software should be interpreted as "tangible personal" property. See e.g., Symposium, Warranty Protection for High-Tech Products and Services, Federal Trade Commission (2000) , at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/warranty/.
50 Some sellers offer a menu of maintenance and support services for an additional price or under a separate contract, while others just include basic maintenance and technical support in the products' base price. To be able to make meaningful comparisons among firms, I counted whether a company includes a base level of maintenance and support (over 30 days) in its base price, and then used the product's price as a control variable instead of recording whether a firm offers support under separate contract. attainable score is -20, indicating a contract that disclaims all remedies and greatly restricts buyers' use of the software. It is important to note that the overall index score for each EULA should not be interpreted as measuring whether the contract is biased for or against the seller in an absolute sense, but rather as a measure of bias relative to the default rules of Article 2 of the UCC. It would be more difficult and problematic to construct an absolute measure of bias, as one would have to consider elements unique to specific software product categories. Indeed, one reason the range of possible scores is not centered at zero is that the default rules of the UCC tend to benefit buyers. Table 4 shows that the average overall bias index score in the sample is -5.63, meaning that, on average, contracts are considerably more pro-seller than the default rules of the UCC.
The minimum overall score in our sample is -15 and the maximum is 2. Thus, there is a very wide range in how buyer-friendly are software license agreements. These summary statistics are quite close to those reported in Marotta-Wurgler, which is not surprising since the current sample contains 515 out of the 647 EULAs that I study there.
VI. ARE "PAY NOW, TERMS LATER" EULAS WORSE FOR BUYERS?
A. Overall Bias and Accessibility
We are now ready to address the central debate involving rolling contracts, namely, whether hidden terms are more one-sided than terms made available before purchase. Table 5 presents the average overall bias of EULAs by the degree of their accessibility. It also compares the mean bias of EULAs of a given accessibility to the mean bias of rolling EULAs (abbreviated PNTL in the table, for Pay Now, Terms Later).
The results show that those EULAs made available before purchase are actually significantly less buyer-friendly than rolling EULAs. In particular, findable EULAs are less buyer-friendly than rolling EULAs by 0.62 points, a statistically significant difference. Findable EULAs can be broken down further, into those that are Forced and those that are not. While Findable EULAs of both types are significantly more pro-seller than rolling contracts, it is particularly surprising that the Forced EULAs-those that the buyer must explicitly acknowledge before buying the product-are the most one-sided contracts of all. This is in striking contrast to the view that sellers hide more one-sided contracts. Table 6 analyzes these effects using regression analysis. The dependent variable is the overall bias index. The first column shows the most basic test, where the dummy Findable is the only independent variable. This simply replicates the result in the first row of Table 5 . The second column uses Forced as the only independent variable. The third column shows that among the subset of EULAs that are not Forced but still Findable, there is no relationship between bias and how distant (i.e., how many clicks away) the EULA is from the most obvious path of purchase. This is another strike against the view that sellers hide particularly one-sided contracts. The fourth column separates the effects of Forced and Findable by including both in the regression. It shows that a Forced EULA scores an additional 0.48 points lower, on average, than one that is Findable but not Forced, but the difference between those two groups is not significant. These results could also be anticipated from Table 5 . Of course, we cannot immediately conclude that a EULA that is two-thirds of a point or one point more pro-seller would be perceived by a buyer as worse in any meaningful sense.
However, for my purpose, this is a secondary issue. The key point is that rolling contracts are clearly not more pro-seller than those made available before purchase. Put simply, the evidence rejects the main arguments presented against rolling contracts.
B. The Effect of Buyer Type, and Seller and Product Characteristics
The remaining specifications of Table 6 add control variables and split the sample into consumer-and business-oriented products. The effects of Forced and Findable remain generally similar when controlling for product category fixed effects, company size and age, product price, and the consumer product dummy, but with the inclusion of these controls Forced and Findable usually are not both significant. Consistent with the results in Marotta-Wurgler, larger companies and younger companies tend to present more pro-seller terms. 51 The size relationship may have to do with the fact that larger companies are more likely to obtain legal advice from counsel who may take more precautions to limit exposure to liability. The age relationship may involve seller reputation. Older companies may create a more homogenous customer base over time and thus 51 Id.
be better able to provide insurance for certain types losses, as opposed to companies with a very diverse customer base. However, this is speculation.
Critics of rolling contracts have been particularly concerned that sellers will take advantage of unsophisticated non-business-type buyers who are believed to lack the resources, knowledge, and ability to comparison shop for terms. Whereas Table 3 showed that sellers do not hide EULAs of products directed to the general public more than they do their businessoriented products' EULAs, the coefficient on Consumer in Table 6 tests whether non-businessoriented products have EULAs that are more pro-seller. Again consistent with the results in the Marotta-Wurgler analysis, there is no consistent relationship between whether the software is directed to members of the general population and the overall bias, thus lending no support to the hypothesis that sellers take special advantage of non-business buyers.
I also consider a related hypothesis. If non-business buyers are less sophisticated and resourceful than business buyers, perhaps sellers will only try to hide one-sided terms for consumer-oriented products. The last two specifications test this by examining whether EULA location affects overall bias for a given buyer type. The results show that rolling contracts are not worse for either type of product; rather, Forced and/or Findable contracts are worse for both business-and consumer-oriented products.
C. EULA Bias by Subindex and Accessibility
As noted earlier, a drawback of the overall index is that it implicitly assumes that all provisions matter equally to buyers. However, suppose that buyers care only about certain provisions, and that sellers hide contracts that are worse on those provisions but not worse overall. For instance, Korobkin suggests that buyers value only salient terms of standard form contracts, such as warranties. 52 If that is the case, then we should ask whether sellers who use rolling contracts offer worse warranties, rather than worse terms overall.
This section addresses this question by studying the relationship between EULA location and subindex bias scores. I create seven subindexes that capture the net bias of each group of terms detailed in Table 4 . For example, the transfer of license ubindex is comprised of two terms:
"are there restrictions on transfer?" and "can the licensee transfer the software to an end user who accepts the license terms without the licensor's prior permission?" I then repeat the previous regression analysis but use the bias of each subindex as the dependent variable.
52 See Korobkin, supra note 35.
The results in Table 7 show that hidden EULAs are not worse on any of the main groups of terms that comprise such contracts. In other words, hidden contracts are not worse in any particular dimension. In fact, consistent with earlier results, the only significant pattern is that sellers who make their EULAs more accessible actually offer worse terms in various respects. This is the true for transfer of license, limitations on liability, and conflict resolution provisions.
Given that conflict resolution provisions such as forum selection and arbitration are often mentioned as the most regular form of seller "abuse," it is noteworthy that software publishers do not rely on delayed disclosure as a way of imposing such terms.
53
Finally, in results that are omitted to save space, I repeat the regressions in Table 7 but restrict the sample to consumer-oriented products only to investigate whether sellers take advantage of consumers by hiding particular one-sided terms. I find that with the exception of limitations on liability, unsophisticated consumers do not receive worse terms than business buyers. And, they tend to receive more pro-buyer terms with respect to transfer of license and conflict resolution.
VII. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
"Pay now, terms later" or "rolling" contracts are increasingly common with the acceleration of commerce over the Internet and telephone. The goal of this article is to address the debate about whether rolling contracts impose harsher terms on buyers from an empirical
perspective. I collect and analyze the terms of several hundred end-user license agreements for software packages sold online. The wide variation in the degree of pre-purchase accessibility of these EULAs enables me to give a fairly convincing answer to whether rolling contracts do, or do not, offer worse terms to buyers.
I find that the terms included in rolling contracts are not systematically more pro-seller than those included in contracts disclosed before purchase. In fact, contrary to fears often associated with rolling contracts, I find that contracts displayed pre-purchase are actually somewhat more pro-seller than rolling contracts. I find similar results after controlling for product price, seller size, consumer-versus business-product orientation, and other effects. It is important to note that my tests are not designed to address whether sellers offer poor quality terms in an absolute sense, but rather they are focused on the comparative analysis between terms that are made available pre-purchase and those that are not. Thus, the appropriate conclusion is that to the extent that there are inefficiencies associated with standard-form contracts, they are not made worse by delayed disclosure. This conclusion is encouraging to supporters of Judge Easterbrook's rationale for enforcing rolling contracts. It also implies that regulation directed at eliminating or reforming rolling contracts-such as the recent proposals to revise section 2-207 of the UCC to require sellers to follow specific disclosure practices-is not warranted, nor is the strong opposition to the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act on the grounds that it allows for delayed disclosure. The maximum age is set to 25, as operations before 1980 were unlikely to emphasize software publishing. Price is the price of the product for which the EULA is obtained and is from the company's website. Consumer Product is a dummy variable for whether the target user of the product is the general public (or small business users) rather than large business users. Trial Exists is a dummy variable for whether the seller offers a free trial version of the product. In the first two models, the dependent variable is Findable, a dummy variable indicating that the contract is available on the company's website. In the middle two models, the dependent variable is Forced, a dummy variable indicating that consumers are required to agree with the EULA before purchasing. In the last two models, the dependent variable is Distance, which measures, for contracts that are Findable, the number of clicks the EULA is away from the purchasing consumer's natural click path. The independent variables are a dummy indicating a consumer-oriented product, the natural log of the price of the product, whether there is a trial version of the software available on the website, dummies for multi-user and developer licenses (the default category is singleuser license), the size of the company as proxied by the natural log of revenue, and the natural log of the age of the company since incorporating as of 2005. Even-numbered models include market fixed effects based on Amazon.com software classifications. Standard errors are in parentheses. The independent variables include measures of pre-purchase accessibility (Findable, Forced, or Distance), product characteristics (a dummy for consumer-oriented products, the log of the product's price, a dummy for whether a trial version of the product is offered, a dummy for EULAs allowing for multiple users, and a dummy for developer licenses), company characteristics (natural log of revenue, natural log of years since incorporation, and a dummy for publicly traded), and software market dummies based on Amazon.com classifications. The first seven specifications include all licenses with available data, and the last two specifications are restricted to licenses of business-oriented software and consumer-oriented software. ) . Even-numbered models also include controls for product characteristics (a dummy for consumer-oriented products, the log of the product's price, a dummy for whether a trial version of the product is offered, a dummy for EULAs allowing for multiple users, and a dummy for developer licenses), company characteristics (natural log of revenue, natural log of years since incorporation, and a dummy for publicly traded), and software market dummies based on Amazon.com classifications. Standard errors are in parentheses. Overall Bias Index
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